Tej Kiran Jain v. N. Sanjiva Reddy

LITERAL RULE

INTRODUCTION

The rule of literal construction is considered to be the first principle of interpretation. According to this rule, the words of an enactment are to be given their ordinary and natural meaning if it is clear and unambiguous. Where wordings of a statute are absolutely clear and unambiguous, the rule of literal construction is applied and recourse to other principles of interpretation is not required. Unless the law is logically defective and suffers from conceptual and inherent ambiguity, it should be given its literal meaning. The words of a statute are first understood in their natural, ordinary or popular sense and phrases and sentences are construed according to their grammatical meaning, unless that leads to some absurdity or they suggest a contrary meaning. Where the meaning of a word or expression is not clear, the literal rule of interpretation is not applicable. Ordinarily, court should not depart from literal rule as that would really be amending the law in the garb of interpretation, which is not permissible. Only when literal construction results in some absurdity or anomaly, other principles of interpretation may be applied.

{1.7 Rule of Literal Construction, by Avatar Singh}

FACTS

The Appellants, admirers of Jagaduru Shankaracharya of Goverdan Peeth, Puri, claimed to be scandalised by certain statements made in Lok Sabha by Shri Narendra Kumar Salve during a Calling Attention Motion. The motion discussed the Shankaracharya's observations at a conference in Patna in March 1969 regarding untouchability being in harmony with Hinduism and his walking away during the playing of the National Anthem. The Appellants brought an action for damages (Rs 26,000) against the speakers, but the plaintiff was rejected as the High Court held that it had no jurisdiction to try the suit.

ISSUE

The issue pertaining to the current case is whether the statements said during the Calling Attention Motion are protected under the provisions of the Constitution, specifically from court proceedings for damages.

RULE

Article 105(2) of the Constitution states that:

“No member of Parliament shall be liable to any proceedings in any Court in respect of anything said or any vote given by him in Parliament or any committee thereof, and no person shall be so liable in respect of the publication by or under the authority of either House of Parliament of any report, paper, votes or proceedings.”

JUDGEMENT OF THE HIGH COURT

The High Court held that no proceedings could be taken in a Court of law in respect of what was said on the floor of Parliament in view of Article 105(2) of the Constitution. The High Court certified the case for appeal to the Supreme Court.

JUDGEMENT AND ANALYSIS

• This Hon'ble court observed that the High Court was correct in stating that no proceedings could lie in the court and the plaint must be rejected.

• The court applied the Literal Rule stating that it wasn’t possible to read the provisions of Article 105 in any other way than what the language suggested. The language "could not be plainer."

• The Article confers immunity inter alia in respect of “anything said......in Parliament”. The court further observed that the word ‘anything’ is of the widest import and is equivalent to ‘everything’.

• The only limitation arose within the words “in parliament” which meant during the sitting and in the course of business of the Parliament.

• Once it was proved sufficiently that Parliament was sitting and its business was being transacted, anything said during the course of that business was immune from proceedings in any Court.

• The court emphasized that it is of the essence of the parliamentary system of Government that people’s representatives should be allowed to freely express themselves without the fear of legal consequences. This Hon'ble court stated that the courts have no say in the matters involving speeches of Lok Sabha.

• It was concluded that the decision under appeal was correct and this Hon'ble court dismissed the appeal.