Sirsilk Ltd. v. Govt. of Andhra Pradesh

HARMONIOUS CONSTRUCTION

INTRODUCTION

The basis of the principle of harmonious construction is that the legislature never intends to contradict itself by providing two repugnant provisions in the same statute. The Act has to be read as a whole and its provisions have to be harmonised giving effect to all of them. The rule of harmonious construction says that when two or more provisions of the same statute are repugnant, the Court tries to construe these provisions in such a manner, as to give effect to both by harmonising them with each other. The court may do so either by holding two or more apparently conflicting provisions as dealing with separate situations or by holding that one provision merely provides for an exception of the general rule contained therein. The court had an endeavor to always adopt the harmonious construction. It was examined that the entire statute must be first read as a whole, then Section by Section, clause by clause, phrase by phrase and word by word, and the relevant provisions must be read harmoniously.

Harmonious construction should be applied to statutory rules and courts should avoid absurd or unintended results. It should be resorted to making the provision meaningful in the context. Where there appears to be inconsistency in two Sections of the same Act, the principle of harmonious construction should be followed. Conflicting statutory provisions should be harmoniously construed for avoiding interpretation which may render any one of them ineffective or otiose or surplusage.

{1.10 Harmonious Construction, Avatar singh}

FACTS

There was a certain dispute between the Appellant and the workmen which was referred to the Industrial Tribunal, Andhra Pradesh in 1956. The Tribunal sent its award to the Government in September 1957. The government was required to publish the award within the period of thirty days from the date of its receipt by the Government, according to Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. However, before the government could publish the award, the parties came to a settlement and requested the government not to publish the award. The government however expressed its inability to withhold the publication of the award due to the mandate of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

ISSUE

Whether the publication of the award under Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is directory or mandatory.

RULE

• Section 17 Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

• Section 18 Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

DECISION OF THE HIGH COURT

The High Court held that Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 was mandatory and it was not open to the Government to withhold publication of an award sent to it by an Industrial Tribunal. Therefore it was not open to the High Court to direct the Government not to publish the award.

JUDGEMENT AND ANALYSIS

• The court examined that the award be published by the government within thirty days from its receipt as per Section 17(1). The usage of the word “shall” is a pointer to Section 17(1) being mandatory, though in certain circumstances the word “shall” used in a statute may be equal to the word “may”. In the present case, the word “shall” was used in Section 17(1) the intention was to give a mandate to the Government to publish the award within the prescribed time period. This is enforced through Section 17(2) which provides that “the award published under sub-Section (1) shall be final and shall not be called in question by any court in any manner whatsoever”. Further, Section 17-A envisages that the award must be published though the Government may declare in certain contingencies that it may not be enforceable. Hence, the court was of the opinion that after a combined reading of the Sections 17 and 17A, the provision for its publication is mandatory and not merely directory.

• However, the issue of the mandatory characteristic didn’t end post the isolated discussion of Sections 17 and 17A, especially after the amendment of the act through which Section 18(1) was introduced. It discusses that a settlement arrived at by agreement between the employer and workmen otherwise than in the course of conciliation proceedings shall be binding on the parties to the agreement. Further, Section 2(p) defines “Settlement”. The court further emphasised on the conflicted nature of the provision i.e. mandatory or directory and stated that it would have been easier to enter into a settlement if it would have been arrived at between the parties while the dispute was pending before the tribunal.

• In State of Bihar v. D.N. Ganguly, it was held that where a settlement has been arrived at between the parties while an industrial dispute is pending before a tribunal, the only remedy for giving effect to such a settlement would be to cancel the reference, unlike in the present case wherein the matter had gone beyond the purview of the tribunal.

• The court concluded that in scenarios such as the present one, even though Section 17(1) is mandatory and the Government is bound to publish the award received by it from an Industrial Tribunal, the current situation is of an exceptional nature and requires reconciliation between Section 18(1) and Section 18(3). This can only be done if the publishing of the award is withheld considering a binding settlement has already come into picture. The court finally held that in such cases, the government should not publish the award even though the characteristic of the Section 17 is mandatory in nature.

• Another alternative opinion was also stated by this Hon'ble Court wherein it examined that where a settlement has already been arrived at after the award has been submitted to the government, the award should not be published as there is no dispute left to be resolved.

Extension: The Remington Rand of India Ltd. v. The Workmen ((1968) 1 SCR 164: AIR 1968 SC 224)

HARMONIOUS CONSTRUCTION

The court observed that the provision related to time limit in Section 17(1) Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is merely directory and not mandatory. Section 17(1) makes it obligatory on the Government to publish the award. The limit of time has been fixed as showing that the publication of the award ought not to be held up. But such a fixation doesn't mean that the publication beyond that time will render the award invalid. If such an invalidity would have been allowed, it would attach undue importance to a provision not in the mind of the legislature. If the award becomes invalid merely on the grounds of publication after thirty days, it might entail a fresh reference with unnecessary harassment to the parties. The non-publication of the award within the period of thirty days does not entail any penalty and this is simply another consideration.