R.M.D. Chamarbaugwalla v. Union of India

MISCHIEF RULE

INTRODUCTION

Mischief Rule is applicable where the language is capable of more than one meaning. When the question arises as to the meaning of a certain provision in a statute, it is proper to read that provision in its context. The context means “the statute as a whole, the previous state of law, other statutes in pari materia, the general scope of the statute and the mischief that it was intended to remedy.” Further, it is the duty of the court to make such construction of a statute which shall suppress the mischief and advance the remedy. This rule was established in England when Heydon’s Case was decided that for the sure and true interpretation of all statutes in general (be they penal or beneficial, restrictive or enlarging of the common law) four things are to be discerned and considered:

1. What was the common law before the making of the Act,

2. What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide,

3. What remedy the Parliament hath resolved and appointed to cure the disease of the commonwealth,

4. The true reason of the remedy.

For an application of the mischief rule:

• Firstly, it must be possible to determine from a consideration of the provisions of the Act read as a whole what the mischief was that was the purpose of the Act to remedy;

• Secondly, it must be apparent that the draftsman and Parliament had by inadvertence overlooked, and so omitted to deal with, an eventuality that required to be dealt with if the purpose of the Act was to be achieved; and

• Thirdly, it must be possible to state with certainty what were the additional words that would have been inserted by the draftsman and approved by Parliament had their attention been drawn to the omission before the Bill passed into law.

Unless these three conditions are fulfilled any attempt by a court of justice to repair the omission in the Act and to determine what is the meaning of a written law, which Parliament has passed cannot be justified as an exercise of its jurisdiction.

{1.11 Mischief Rule, Avatar Singh} {6.3.2 Mischief rule of interpretation, N.S. Bindra}

FACTS

The parliament had enacted the Prize Competitions Act 1955 in pursuance to the wishes of multiple states in the form of resolutions under Article 252(1) of the Constitution. The Petitioners were engaged in promoting and conducting prize competitions in several states of India, and they have filed the present petitions under Article 32 questioning the validity of some of the provisions of the Act and the rules framed thereunder.

ISSUE

The issues involved in the present case referred to:

• Whether Section 2(d) applies to competitions which involve substantial skill and are not in the nature of gambling;

• If issue 1 holds true, can the Sections 4 and 5 and Rules 11 and 12 on the principle of severability be enforced against competitions which are in the nature of gambling.

RULE

The legislation in question is the Prize Competitions Act 1955 and the object of the legislation, as clearly mentioned in the preamble, is to provide for the control and regulation of prize competitions. As per its history, its genesis was to be found in the Bombay Lotteries and Prize Competitions Control and Tax Act (Bom 54 of 1948) mainly with the object of controlling and taxing lotteries and prize competitions within the Province of Bombay, and as originally enacted, it applied only to competitions conducted within the Province of Bombay. But eventually it was adopted by other states also.

Following are some provisions that are relevant for the current discussion:

• Section 2(d) of the Act defines “prize competition” as meaning “any competition (whether called a cross-word prize competition, a missing-word prize competition, a picture prize competition or by any other name), in which prizes are offered for the solution of any puzzle based upon the building up, arrangement, combination or permutation of letters, words or figures.”

• Sections 4 and 5 of the act were provisions that were impugned as unConstitutional.

• Section 7 of the Act provided that “a prize competition shall be deemed to be an unlawful prize competition unless a licence in respect of such competition has been obtained by the promoter thereof”.

• Section 12 imposed a tax on the amounts received in respect of competitions which had been licensed under the Act.

• Section 20 is related to licensing, maintaining of accounts and penalties for violation and confers power on the State Governments to frame rules for carrying out the purpose of the Act.

JUDGEMENT AND ANALYSIS

• This Hon'ble court took the assistance of a few relevant case laws before characterising its observations.

  • Heydon’s case mentions: “To arrive at the real meaning, it is always necessary to get an exact conception of the aim, scope and object of the whole Act. Lor Coke states (1) What was the law before the Act was passed; (2) What was the mischief or defect for which the law had not provided; (3) What remedy Parliament has appointed; and (4) The reason of the remedy”

  • Bengal Immunity Company Limited v. State of Bihar states that it is imperative to regard all the factors that can be taken into account in ascertaining the intention of the legislature, such as the history of the legislation its purpose, the mischief which it intended to suppress and the other provisions of the statute, and construe the language of Section 2(d).

• This court held that Section 2(d) should be construed considering the historical background of the act and the mischief that was intended to be suppressed. Having taken such factors into consideration, there wasn’t any doubt that the State Legislatures moved the Parliament to enact a legislation under article 252 with the sole objective of controlling and regulating prize competitions of gambling nature. If the state legislatures had the intention to regulate the competitions based on skill, they would have successfully done that without resorting to special jurisdiction under article 252.

• Further, the use of the word “Control” in the resolutions of the state legislatures wouldn’t seem appropriate if it was intended that the Parliament should legislate on competitions involving skill.

• It was concluded that the impugned provisions applied by virtue of Section 2(d) to all kinds of competitions, was severable in their application to competitions in which success does not depend to any substantial extent on skill. Therefore, the competitions which were sought to be controlled and regulated were only those wherein the success did not depend on any degree of skill.

{pg 41 The Interpretation of Statutes by Bhattacharyya}