Rev. Stainislaus v. State of Madhya Pradesh

PURPOSIVE CONSTRUCTION

INTRODUCTION

Purposive Construction discusses the importance of the purport and object of the act. It also states that a statute must be read in its entirety and the purport and object of the Act must be given its full effect by applying principles of purposive construction. A purposive construction promoting the object of the enactment but not extending its sweep beyond the frontiers within which it was intended to operate must be adopted, keeping in view that a construction which exempts a person from its operation must be preferred to the one which includes him in it, in view of the penal nature of the statute. It is normally based on three components namely, language, purpose and discretion. It is the duty of the courts to accept a construction which promotes the object of the legislation and also prevents its possible abuse even though the mere possibility of abuse of a provision does not affect its Constitutionality or construction. Purposive construction can only be resorted to when the language of a provision is capable of more than one interpretation. Where literal construction or plain meaning may cause hardship, futility, absurdity or uncertainty, the purposive or contextual construction may be preferred to arrive at a more just, reasonable and sensible result.

{1.12, Purposive Construction, Avatar Singh}

FACTS

The Sub-Divisional Magistrate of Baloda-Bazar sanctioned the prosecution of Rev. Stainislaus for the commission of offence under Sections 3, 4 and 5(2) of the Madhya Pradesh Dharma Swatantraya Adhiniyam, 1968. The Appellant raised a preliminary objection that the State Legislature did not have the necessary legislative competence and the Madhya Pradesh Act was ultra vires the Constitution as it did not fall within the purview of Entry 1 of List II and Entry 1 of List III of the Seventh Schedule. A similar controversy arose concerning the Orissa Freedom of Religion Act, 1967.

ISSUE

The issue pertaining to the current scenario was whether the two Acts (M.P. and Orissa) were violative of the fundamental right guaranteed under Article 25(1) of the Constitution, and whether the State Legislatures were competent to enact them.

RULE

Article 25(1) of the Indian Constitution states that:

“Subject to public order, morality and health and to the other provisions of this Part, all persons are equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practise and propagate religion.”

JUDGEMENT AND ANALYSIS

• The Appellant contended that the right to ‘propagate’ one’s religion means the right to convert a person to one’s own religion. This Hon'ble court examined that the word “propagate” has multiple meanings. It has been defined in the Shorter Oxford Dictionary to mean “to spread from person to person, or from place to place, to disseminate, diffuse (a statement, belief, practice, etc.)”.

• The court observed that “propagate” was used in the sense wherein it grants the right to transmit or spread one's own religion and not a right to convert someone to one's own religion. The Article guarantees “freedom of conscience” to every citizen, and not merely to the followers of one particular religion, and that, in turn, postulates that there is no fundamental right to convert another person to one’s own religion otherwise it would impinge on the “freedom of conscience” of the converted person.

• The court relied on the interpretation in Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v. State of Bombay, stating that the freedom of religion is not guaranteed in respect of one religion only, but covers all religions alike, and it can be properly enjoyed by a person if he exercises his right in a manner commensurate with the like freedom of persons following the other religions.

• This Hon'ble court further discussed the Acts' provisions. The M.P. Act prohibits conversion by use of force, allurement, or fraudulent means. Similarly, the Orissa Act prohibits forcible conversion by the use of force or by inducement or by any fraudulent means.

• The court concluded that these Acts clearly provide for the maintenance of public order. The expression “public order” is a wide connotation, as stated in Ramesh Thappar v. State of Madras, signifying the state of tranquillity which prevails among the members of a political society.

• If an attempt was made to raise communal passions, e.g. on the ground that someone has been “forcibly” converted to another religion, it would, in all probability, give rise to an apprehension of a breach of the public order, affecting the community at large. Therefore, such acts fall within the purview of Entry 1 of List II of the Seventh Schedule (Public Order) as they are meant to avoid disturbances to the public order by prohibiting conversion from one religion to another in a manner reprehensible to the conscience of the community. They do not provide for the regulation of religion, hence don't fall under Entry 97 of List I of the Seventh Schedule.