Padma Sundara Rao v. State of T.N.

INTRODUCTION

The rule of literal construction is considered to be the first principle of interpretation. According to this rule, the words of an enactment are to be given their ordinary and natural meaning if it is clear and unambiguous. Where wordings of a statute are absolutely clear and unambiguous, the rule of literal construction is applied and recourse to other principles of interpretation is not required. Unless the law is logically defective and suffers from conceptual and inherent ambiguity, it should be given its literal meaning. The words of a statute are first understood in their natural, ordinary or popular sense and phrases and sentences are construed according to their grammatical meaning, unless that leads to some absurdity or they suggest a contrary meaning. Ordinarily, court should not depart from literal rule as that would really be amending the law in the garb of interpretation, which is not permissible. Only when literal construction results in some absurdity or anomaly, other principles of interpretation may be applied.

{1.7 Rule of Literal Construction, by Avatar Singh}

FACTS

The notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was issued before the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, but after the commencement of the 1967 Ordinance. A subsequent declaration under Section 6(1) was made and published within the then-prescribed three-year period. Undisputedly, this Section 6 declaration was quashed by the High Court in an earlier proceeding. The current notification under Section 6 was questioned before the Madras High Court, which relied on the decision of a three-Judge Bench in N. Narasimhaiah v. State of Karnataka.

ISSUE

The issue pertaining to the current case deals with whether, after the notification under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 is quashed, a fresh period of one year is available to the State Government to issue another notification under Section 6 of the said Act.

RULE

Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (as applicable to the period) discusses the declaration that land is required for a public purpose. The relevant part for limitation states:

Provided that no declaration in respect of any particular land covered by a notification under Section 4(1) -

(i) published after the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment and Validation) Ordinance, 1967, but before the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, shall be made after the expiry of three years from the date of the publication of the notification; or

(ii) published after the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, shall be made after the expiry of one year from the date of the publication of the notification:

Explanation. - In computing any of the periods referred to in the first proviso, the period during which any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the notification issued under Section 4(1), is stayed by an order of a court shall be excluded.

JUDGEMENTS REFERRED

• N. Narasimhaiah v. State of Karnataka: This judgment held that if the Section 6 declaration was quashed, the limitation period would start running from the date of the High Court's order, effectively allowing a fresh period.

• State of Karnataka v. D.C. Nanjudaiah: This case further stretched the view, holding that the limitation period would run from the date of the receipt of the order of the High Court.

JUDGEMENT AND ANALYSIS

• This Hon'ble court stated that a well-settled principle in law exists which states that the court cannot read anything into a statutory provision which is plain and unambiguous. The language employed in the statute is the determinative factor of a legislative intent. Therefore, the primary principle of construction was that the intention of the legislature must be found within the words used by the legislature itself. The question is not what may be supposed and has been intended but what has been said.

• The court observed that the purpose of providing the period of limitation was a means of avoidance of inconvenience to an individual whose land was required to be acquired and to prevent delay in acquisition proceedings.

• The court was deemed to interpret the law and not legislate it. The legislative casus omissus (an omission in the statute) cannot be supplied by judicial interpretive process.

• The court found the language of Section 6(1) plain and unambiguous. The proviso specifically mentions only one reason for excluding a period from computation: where the proceeding is stayed by an order of a court. There is no provision to exclude the period where the Section 6 declaration is quashed, nor is there a provision for a fresh start of the limitation period.

• The court held that the views expressed in the Narasimhaiah case and the Nanjudaiah case were not correct and could not be reconciled with the plain language of Section 6(1). Accepting that view would mean the court was creating a "non-prescribed period," which was never the legislative intent.

• The court finally held that the casuss omissus couldn't be supplied by the court except in the case of immense necessity and when its reason was found within the four corners of the statute itself.

• The final ruling was that no fresh period of one year/three years is available to the State Government to issue a fresh Section 6 declaration after the earlier one is quashed by the court. However, to avoid opening cases that had already attained finality, the judgment was to be applied prospectively.

{pg 89, Interpretation of Statutes, Bhattacharya}