K.M. Nanavati v. State of Bombay

HARMONIOUS CONSTRUCTION

INTRODUCTION

The basis of the principle of harmonious construction is that the legislature never intends to contradict itself by providing two repugnant provisions in the same statute. The Act has to be read as a whole and its provisions have to be harmonised giving effect to all of them. The rule of harmonious construction says that when two or more provisions of the same statute are repugnant, the Court tries to construe these provisions in such a manner, as to give effect to both by harmonising them with each other. The court may do so either by holding two or more apparently conflicting provisions as dealing with separate situations or by holding that one provision merely provides for an exception of the general rule contained therein. Conflicting statutory provisions should be harmoniously construed for avoiding interpretation which may render any one of them ineffective or otiose or surplusage.

{1.10 Harmonious Construction, Avatar singh}

FACTS

The Petitioner, K.M. Nanavati, was Second in Command of I.N.S. Mysore. On April 27, 1959, he was arrested for a charge of murder. His trial by a jury resulted in a "Not Guilty" verdict, but the Sessions Judge disagreed and referred the case to the High Court under Section 307 Cr.P.C. The High Court accepted the reference, convicted the Petitioner under Section 302 I.P.C., and sentenced him to life imprisonment. On the same day, the Governor of Bombay passed an order suspending the sentence until the appeal was filed and disposed of by the Supreme Court, exercising powers under Article 161 of the Constitution.

ISSUE

Whether the order of the Governor of Bombay, passed under Article 161 (Executive Power to suspend sentence), impinges upon the judicial powers of the Supreme Court conferred upon it through Article 142 (inherent power to pass any necessary order) and the relevant Supreme Court Rules.

RULES

• Article 72/161 (Constitution): Deals with the power of the President/Governor to grant pardons, reprieves, respites or remissions of punishment or to suspend, remit or commute sentences.

• Article 142 (Constitution): Empowers the Supreme Court to pass any decree or make any order necessary for doing complete justice in any cause or matter pending before it.

• Section 401 Cr.P.C.: Executive power to suspend or remit sentences (before the Constitution).

• Section 426 Cr.P.C.: Power of the Court to suspend sentence pending appeal.

DECISION OF THE HIGH COURT

The High Court held that the Governor's order was not invalid, did not affect the power of the Supreme Court, and was not unconstitutional. It held that the warrant should not be reissued until the appeal to the Supreme Court had been disposed of.

JUDGEMENT AND ANALYSIS

• The court observed that both the Governor (under Article 161) and the Supreme Court (under Article 142/Rules) had powers regarding the suspension of a sentence. Since both provisions were essentially unfettered (contained no words of limitation), a Harmonious Construction was necessary to avoid a conflict of jurisdiction between the Executive and the Judiciary.

• The court first harmonised the statutory provisions: It held that Section 401 Cr.P.C. deals with the power of remission/suspension in general, where no appeal is pending, whereas Section 426 Cr.P.C. deals with the special case where an appeal is pending before an Appellate Court.

• Applying this logic to the Constitutional powers: The court stated that while the Governor has the wide power of "mercy jurisdiction" (like granting a full pardon) which the judiciary lacks, the power of suspension of sentence overlaps when the matter is sub judice before the Court.

• Harmonisation Principle Applied: The court held that the Governor's power to suspend sentence under Article 161 does not deal with the period during which Article 142 is in operation and the matter is sub judice in this court.

• Conclusion: The Governor's order granting suspension of the sentence could only operate until the matter became sub judice in the Supreme Court (i.e., upon the filing of the petition for special leave to appeal). The Governor had no power to grant the suspension of sentence for the period during which the matter was before the Supreme Court, as this would be an encroachment on the judicial field.

DISSENTING OPINION

Justice Kapur J. observed that the two articles (142 and 161) operate in two distinct fields where different conditions apply. He argued that the articles are reconcilable and should be reconciled by reading them literally, and that no rule of construction requires introducing limitations when the words of the statute convey a clear meaning.

{pg 17, Interpretation of Statutes by Sarathi}