
On July 4, 1977, the Government of India, through the Regional Passport Office, ordered the impounding of the passport of Maneka Gandhi (a journalist) under Section 10(3)(c) of the Passport Act, 1967, citing ‘public interest’. The Petitioner was mandated to surrender her passport within seven days.
The Petitioner requested the reasons for this action. The Government replied that it had decided not to furnish the reasons “in the interest of the general public”, relying on Section 10(5) of the Passport Act.
The Petitioner filed a writ petition in the Supreme Court under Article 32, challenging the Government's action as arbitrary and violative of her fundamental rights under Articles 14, 19, and 21, specifically contending that no opportunity to be heard (natural justice) was provided before the impounding order.
What is the scope of the word “procedure established by law” in Article 21?
Whether there exists a nexus between Article 14, Article 19, and Article 21 of the Constitution (Doctrine of Inter-relationship of Fundamental Rights)?
Whether the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21 contains in itself the right to travel abroad?
Whether Section 10(3)(c) of the Passport Act is violative of Articles 14, 19, and 21?
The Petitioner contended that Section 10(3)(c) is ultra vires Article 21 because it provides for impounding without any reasonable, just, and fair procedure, or without one that complies with natural justice.
Secondly, Section 10(3)(c) is violative of Articles 19(1)(a) (freedom of speech) and 19(1)(g) (freedom of profession) as impounding a passport restricts the ability to travel abroad, which is essential for exercising these freedoms, and such restrictions are impermissible under Article 19(2) and 19(6).
The learned Attorney General, appearing for the Union of India, conceded that the nature of the action requires the application of the audi alteram partem rule. However, he argued that the rule must be excluded because if notice were given before impounding, the passport holder might immediately use the passport to exit the country, thereby frustrating the object of impounding.
The Court confined itself to the second rule of natural justice: audi alteram partem (no decision shall be given against a party without affording him a reasonable hearing).
The court held that an order made under Section 10(3)(c) could be declared invalid under Article 19(1)(a) and (g) if it imposed unreasonable restrictions on an individual's freedom. For example, impounding a passport for an indefinite period would be considered an unreasonable restriction.
The judgment, delivered by a seven-judge bench (P.N. Bhagwati J. pronouncing the majority opinion), exponentially expanded the scope of fundamental rights.
Scope of Personal Liberty (Article 21):
The expression ‘personal liberty’ under Article 21 was interpreted in its widest sense, covering a variety of rights that constitute personal liberty.
The right to travel abroad was held to be within the ambit of ‘personal liberty’ under Article 21.
Scope of ‘Procedure Established by Law’:
The phrase ‘procedure established by law’ in Article 21 implies that the procedure shall be reasonable, just, and fair and in compliance with the principles of natural justice.
This landmark view overruled the restrictive interpretation given in A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras (1950) and effectively imported the American concept of ‘due process of law’ into Article 21.
Inter-relationship of Fundamental Rights (The Golden Triangle):
Overruling the A.K. Gopalan view that Articles 14, 19, and 21 are mutually exclusive, the Court held that the fundamental rights under Part III are mutually interdependent and form an integrated scheme.
A law prescribing a procedure for depriving a person of personal liberty under Article 21 must not only be a valid law but must also withstand the test of Articles 14 (equality) and 19 (freedoms) to be constitutionally valid.
Natural Justice (Audi Alteram Partem):
The power of the passport authority to impound a passport is a quasi-judicial power, and hence, the rules of natural justice definitely apply.
Even if the power is considered administrative, the principles of natural justice must still follow since the power interferes with a citizen's right to travel abroad.
The principle of Audi Alteram Partem (right to be heard) must be observed by the passport authority, though the post-decisional hearing (hearing after the order is passed) may be sufficient if pre-decisional hearing frustrates the object of the order (as argued by the Attorney General).
The majority bench did not hold Section 10(3) of the Passport Act per se violative of Articles 14, 19, or 21. The writ petition was disposed of, directing the government to provide a hearing (post-decisional) to the petitioner.