J. R. Raghupathy v. State of A.P., (1988) 4 SCC 364

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J. R. Raghupathy v. State of A.P., (1988) 4 SCC 364
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By FG Lawkit

  • November 3, 2025

J. R. Raghupathy v. State of A.P., (1988) 4 SCC 364

[No powers to the Judiciary to issue writs when there is nothing on record to show that the decision of the Government was arbitrary or capricious or was one not reached in good faith or actuated with improper considerations or influenced by extraneous considerations.]

FACTS:

Writ Petitions were filed in the High Court by individuals and gram panchayats questioning the legality and propriety of the formation of certain Revenue Mandals and location of certain Mandal Headquarters notified in preliminary notification issued under sub-s. (5) of Section 3 of the Andhra Pradesh Districts (Formation) Act, 1974.

  • In some cases, the High Court declined to interfere with the location of Mandal Headquarters, holding that the government was the best judge of the situation, or on the ground that there was a breach of guidelines it directed the Government to reconsider the question of location of the Mandal Headquarters.

  • In some cases, the High Court quashed the final notification for location of the Mandal Headquarters at a particular place, holding that there was a breach of guidelines based on the system of marking and also on the ground that there were no reasons disclosed for deviating from the preliminary notification for location of the Mandal Headquarters at another place.

These appeals by special leave and the connected special leave petitions directed against the various judgments and orders of the Andhra Pradesh High Court involve a question of principle, and relate to the location of Mandal Headquarters in the State of Andhra Pradesh under s. 3(5) of the Andhra Pradesh Districts (Formation) Act, 1974. In the present cases the location of 12 Revenue Mandal Headquarters was under consideration.

ISSUE:

Whether the location of Mandal Headquarters was a purely governmental function and therefore not amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution?

CONTENTIONS:

State Government / Appellants' Contention:

Shri T.V.S.N. Chari, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State Government followed by Dr. Y.S. Chitale, Shri U.R. Lalit and Shri C.S. Vaidyanathan, learned counsel appearing for the appellants in cases where the High Court has interfered have, in substance, contended that suitability as to the location of Mandal Headquarters is for the Government to decide and not for the High Court.

  • They contend that the High Court failed to view the case from a proper perspective.

  • According to them, the guidelines are executive instructions, pure and simple, and have no statutory force.

  • It was pointed out that there is no statutory provision made either in the Act or the Rules framed thereunder laying down the manner in which the location of the Headquarters of a Revenue Mandal was to be made.

  • The Legislature has left the matter of selection of a place to be the Mandal Headquarters to the discretion of the State Government and it was purely a Governmental function based on administrative convenience.

Respondents' Contention:

Shri Seetaramaiah, learned counsel appearing for the respondents in cases where the High Court has interfered, advanced the main argument on the legal aspect and placed all the authorities on this abstruse branch of administrative law, namely, the Courts have albeit the Governmental action which involves exercise of discretionary powers, control over the exercise of such Governmental power by implying limits of reasonableness, relevance and purpose. Judicial control over the executive, or over an administrative authority, must be maintained.

  • Such judicial control by necessary implication is reconciled with legislative intent, on the premise that the legislature never intended that the Government should have unfettered control over a certain area.

  • According to the learned counsel, the traditional position is that Courts will control the existence and extent of prerogative power i.e., governmental power, but not the manner of exercise thereof.

  • What degree or standard of control would then be exercised would depend upon the type of subject-matter in issue.

  • It is urged that the remedy of a writ of mandamus is available if a decision is reached by the Government on the basis of irrelevant considerations or improper purposes or for other misuse of power.

RATIONALE:

Object and Purpose of the Andhra Pradesh District (Formation) Act, 1974

The avowed object and purpose of the Andhra Pradesh District (Formation) Act, 1974, as amended in 1985 was to bring about a change in the Revenue Administration with a view to bring the administration nearer to the people and to make all public services easily available to them. The change in the Revenue Administration was so achieved by the creation of Revenue Mandals in place of taluks and firkas.

  • The guidelines issued by the State Government had no statutory force and they were merely in the nature of executive instructions for the guidance of the Collector.

  • The High Court was not justified in interfering with the orders of the Government regarding location of Mandal Headquarters.

  • Even though the Government acted in breach of the guidelines in that one place of the other, the orders were purely of administrative nature.

  • The High Court has no jurisdiction to sit in appeal over the decision of the State Government to locate the Mandal Headquarters at a particular place.

  • It cannot be said that the impugned action of the Government would result in arbitrariness or absence of fair play or discrimination.

  • Therefore, the approach of the High Court under Article 226 in assuming to itself the function of the Government in weighing the comparative merits and demerits in the matter of location of the Mandal Headquarters was not proper.

Under the Constitution of India Article 73 and 162 : Executive powers of the State and Union government

Powers are wider than the prerogative powers in England. What is called "purely government function", it is said it is nothing but exercise of discretion derived from the royal prerogative. It is alleged that the powers of crown in England are akin to the executive function of the Union and State under Article 73 and 162 of the Constitution. Prima-facie it seems that the executive powers of the Union and State under article 73 and 162 are much wider than the prerogative powers in England.

Article 226: Writ Jurisdiction of HC

The jurisdiction of the High Court to grant an appropriate writ, direction or order under Art. 226 of the Constitution is not subject to the archaic constraints on which prerogative writs were issued in England. Most of the cases in which the English courts had earlier enunciated their limited power to pass on the legality of the exercise of the prerogative were decided at a time when the Courts took a generally rather circumscribed view of their ability to review Ministerial statutory discretion. The decision of the House of Lords in Padfield’s case marks the emergence of the interventionist judicial attitude that has characterized many recent judgments.

All that we need is to end this part of the judgment by extracting the cautionary note administered by H.W.R. Wade in his Administrative Law, 5th edn. at p. 352 in these words: “On the one hand, where Parliament confers power upon some minister or other authority to be used in discretion, it is obvious that the discretion ought to be that of the designated authority and not that of the court. Whether the discretion is exercised prudently or imprudently, the authority’s word is to be law and the remedy is to be political only. On the other hand, Parliament cannot be supposed to have intended that the power should be open to serious abuse. It must have assumed that the designated authority would act properly and responsibly, with a view to doing what was best in the public interest and most consistent with the policy of the statute. It is from this presumption that the courts take their warrant to impose legal bounds on even the most extensive discretion.”

HELD:

  • The Court pointed out that they find it difficult to sustain the judgment of the High Court in some of the cases where it has interfered with the location of Mandal Headquarters and quashed the impugned notifications on the ground that the Government acted in breach of the guidelines in that one place or the other was more centrally located or that location at the other place would promote general public convenience, or that the headquarters should be fixed at a particular place with a view to develop the area surrounded by it.

  • The location of headquarters by the Government by the issue of the final notification under sub-s. (5) of s. 3 of the Act was on a consideration by the Cabinet Sub-Committee of the proposals submitted by the Collectors concerned and the objections and suggestions received from the local authorities like the gram panchayats and the general public.

  • Even assuming that the Government while accepting the recommendations of the Cabinet Sub Committee directed that the Mandal Headquarters should be at place ‘X’ rather than place ‘Y’ as recommended by the Collector concerned in a particular case, the High Court would not have issued a writ in the nature of mandamus to enforce the guidelines which were nothing more than administrative instructions not having any statutory force, which did not give rise to any legal right in favour of the writ petitioners.

  • The result therefore is that Civil Appeals Nos. 1980, 1982, 1985 and 1987 of 1986 and all other appeals and special leave petitions directed against the judgment of the High Court where it has interfered with the location of the Mandal Headquarters, must succeed and were allowed. The petition filed by the appellants under Art. 226 of the Constitution before the High Court are accordingly dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.

  • In conclusion the Apex Court court had ruled that the High Court would not have issued a writ in the nature of mandamus to enforce the guidelines which were nothing more than administrative instructions not having any statutory force, which did not give rise to any legal right in favour of the writ petitioners.