G. Sadananadan v. State of Kerala, AIR 1966 SC 1925: (1966) 3 SCR 590

[RULE OF LAW]

FACTS:

• The petitioner, G. Sadanandan, was detained by Respondent 1, the State of Kerala, under Rule 30(1)(b) of the Defence of India Rules, 1962 (“the Rules”) by an order passed on 20th October, 1965.

• The order stated that the State was satisfied that detention was necessary to prevent the petitioner from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the life of the community (kerosene oil business).

• The petitioner challenges the validity of this order by his present petition filed under Article 32 of the Constitution.

ISSUE:

Orders of detention passed by the appropriate authorities under Rule 30(1)(b) of the Rules are challenged.

PETITIONER’S CONTENTIONS:

1. The petitioner challenges the validity of the impugned order of detention mainly on the ground that it is mala fide, and has been passed as a result of malicious and false reports which have been prepared at the instance of Respondent 2.

2. The whole object of Respondent 2, according to the petitioner, in securing the preparation of these false reports is to eliminate the petitioner from the field of wholesale business in kerosene oil in Trivandrum, so that his relatives may benefit and obtain the dealership of the ESSO Company.

3. The petitioner further alleges that the order of detention has been passed solely with the purpose of denying him the benefit of the order of bail which was passed in his favour by the District Magistrate on 21st October, 1965. In support of the plea the petitioner strongly relies on the fact that on 24th October, 1965, the Kerala Kerosene Control Order, 1965 has come into force and in consequence, unless the petitioner gets a license, it would be impossible for him to carry on his business of kerosene oil; and yet, the detention order, ostensibly passed against him as a result of his prejudicial activities, continues to be enforced against him even after the Control Order has been brought into operation.

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTIONS:

Mr Devassy, the Secretary in the Home Department, stated in his counter-affidavit that the impugned order of detention has been passed by Respondent 1 bonafide and after full consideration of the merits of the case. Respondent 1 was satisfied that the activity of the petitioner was likely to prejudice supplies essential to the life of the community as a whole.

RATIONALE:

1. This Court, no doubt, realises in dealing with pleas for habeas corpus in such proceedings that citizens are detained under the Rules without a trial, and that clearly is inconsistent with the normal concept of the rule of law in a democratic State. But having regard to the fact that an emergency has been proclaimed under Article 352, certain consequences follow, one of which is that citizens detained under the Rules are precluded from challenging the validity of the Rules on the ground that their detention contravenes their fundamental rights guaranteed by Articles 19, 20 and 21.

2. Nevertheless, this Court naturally examines the detention orders carefully and allows full scope to the detenus to urge such statutory safeguards as are permissible under the Rules. The merits of the orders of detention are not open to judicial scrutiny, but this Court will intervene where the impugned orders suffer from serious infirmities, such as being passed without the appropriate authority applying its mind properly to the allegations, or being passed malafide.

3. Unfortunately, in the present case, the affidavit made by the Home Secretary is so defective and in many places so vague and ambiguous that we do not know which authority acting for Respondent 1 in fact examined the case against the petitioner and what was the nature of the material placed before such authority; and the affidavit does not contain any averment that the appropriate authority reached the conclusion that it was satisfied that the petitioner should be detained.

HELD:

In conclusion, when orders of this kind by which citizens are deprived of their fundamental right of liberty without a trial on the ground that the emergency proclaimed by the President in 1962 still continues, the Court feels rudely disturbed by the thought that continuous exercise of the very wide powers conferred by the Rules is likely to make the conscience of the said authorities insensitive, if not blunt, to the paramount requirement of the Constitution that even during emergency, the freedom of Indian citizens cannot be taken away without the existence of the justifying necessity specified by the Rules themselves.

The failure of Respondent 1 to place any such material before us in the present proceedings leaves us no alternative but to accept the plea made by the petitioner that the order of detention passed against him on 20th October, 1965, and more particularly, his continued detention after 24th October, 1965, are totally invalid and unjustified.